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Social or Special Interests:
How Unions Influence Spending
Devon Moffett & Shauna Reilly
Northern Kentucky University
Abstract: Unions are in a decades long decline, heading for the point of non-relevance. To better
understand what this change will entail, this paper asks: how does union strength affect state
spending? Previous research on unions has exhausted the answers to national and congressional
effects, so looking at spending on the state and local level will add more clarity to our understanding
of union influence. Independent data were used to test several areas of spending with multivariate
regressions. Additionally, pairwise comparisons tested whether union influence differs across
areas. It was found that unions have a positive influence on spending independent of the Democratic
Party, and do not have even effects across areas of spending.
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Unions have experienced a continuous decline in
membership since their peak in the 1950s. With the well
documented effects of right-to-work laws on union membership
(i.e. Raymond, Shulman, & Weiler, 2004) in combination with
historic trends, this suggests that they may disappear altogether.
Despite this possibility, unions have thus far remained an
influential political player, even increasing their political action
committee (PAC) contributions over time (Masters & Atkin,
1996). In light of this decline, it is important to investigate how
unions are influencing our society in order to better understand
what their absence would entail. Congressional level and
legislative effects (or lack thereof) have been heavily explored
(Masters & Delaney, 2005), but substantially less analysis has
been paid to how unions affect lower levels of government or
what their presence means for public expenditures. As such, this
paper will confront the following question: How does union
strength affect state and local expenditures?
To answer this question, it must first be understood how
unions are using their political influence. There are three primary
explanations in the literature, each of which are explored in this
paper. Of the three, the social-interest school is identified as both
the most convincing theory of union political influence as well
as the most promising for future research. Using this as a starting
point, this study hypothesized that 1. increasing union strength
will increase social expenditures, 2. that this effect will be
independent of party control, and that 3. the effect will be even
across types of expenditures. A series of regressions on different
areas of public expenditures were then used to test these
hypotheses. The first two hypotheses have nuanced support, with
their basic assertions being true, but with certain exceptions
being raised. The final hypothesis, on the other hand, came to a

puzzling conclusion which provides questions for future
research. With these conclusions in mind, it is easy to see that
the continued decline of unions will have a serious influence on
the future of state public expenditures.
Literature Review
In response to the question of how unions are using their
political influence, there are three main bodies of scholarship.
The first perspective, and for a long time most popular, is that of
the pluralist school, whose scholars present the conclusion that
unions work like any other interest group and would only have
incentive to influence public spending if that spending would
directly benefit union members (Barash, 1947; Freeman &
Murdoff, 1985; Masters, 1998). The second view is that of the
Democratic coalition school, which argues that unions in the
United States have become so engrained in the Democratic
coalition that their political influence is exclusively expressed
through the Democratic Party (Greenstone, 1969; Dark, 2001;
Francia, 2010). The final current of thought is that of the socialinterest school, a recent addition to the literature that argues that
unions have started to direct their independent political influence
toward broader, more socially-minded ends (Coleman, 1988; Ha,
2008).
Pluralist School
Scholars of the pluralist school begin from the
straightforward assumption that unions work similar to other
interest groups, competing with other interest groups to achieve
narrow and specific political goals that secure special advantages
for their members. In this view, unions will primarily support
public expenditures only when their membership can derive a
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direct benefit from said expenditures (Barash, 1947; Delaney,
1991). It is possible for unions to affect broader areas of public
expenditures, but they will only do so when pursuing ties with
other groups who will increase labor’s ability to secure its special
interests (Masters, 1998).
The early development of this school of thought can be seen
through Barash (1947), who used historical examples to
characterize unions as a group which only turns to politics when
its familiar strategy of collective bargaining cannot secure its
interests. Unions would therefore only attempt to influence
social spending to raise their wages, and only when they could
not achieve that by strike or boycott. The application of this early
thought to the present day can be seen in the work of Bennett and
Taylor (2001), who argued that unions exist exclusively to
secure a series of benefits and protections for workers and that
the continuous decline of union strength is indicative of unions
having stabilized workers’ interests and rights to the degree that
they are no longer important for workers.
Scholarship in this school can trace its more modern roots
back to the seminal work of Freeman and Murdoff (1984). When
writing on the political power of unions, the authors
characterized unions as a tragicomic special interest group that,
while primarily looking to preserve its monopoly powers, has
only seen legislation that it favors pass if it has been of a more
“social” nature. Even the success of this social legislation is
through “no virtue of their own”, as the authors showed with
specific legislative examples that such bills passed not by labor
efforts, but rather by existing sentiments in the electorate or in
Congress. The low success rate of unions is a recurring theme in
this literature, although Delaney’s exploration (1991) found that
at times specific political efforts were able to secure legislation
that advantaged unions. A case study of the Communication
Workers of America (CWA) also reinforced the perspective of
unions as a narrow interest group, as the application of
organization theory showed that the CWA was simultaneously
using collective bargaining, politics, and organization to secure
a private advantage for its membership (Katz, Batt, & Keefe,
2003). Those who ascribe to the pluralist school have also been
careful to make the distinction between labor using the
Democratic Party and being a part of it, as can be seen in an
exploration of the 1978 House elections that concluded that party
was incidental to member’s voting records when predicting
union support (Gopoian, Smith, & Smith, 1984).
The most recent scholarship in this tradition has carefully
incorporated literature showing unions’ influence on areas that
do not provide a union advantage. An example of this is present
in Masters’ (1998) examination of the AFSCME, where he
presented the idea of unions engaging in interest group alliances
to achieve their purposes. Nevertheless, he pointed out that both
the contributions and official positions of the AFSCME support
the fact that their reason for being is their members. Asher’s
(2001) extensive contribution took an overall similar approach,
explaining that while unions are too complex to follow a single
strategy, ultimately, they are primarily looking out for special
interests. An example he cited of this being the strategy that the
AFL-CIO’s then recently elected president, Sweeney, adopted

when opposing permanent normal trade relations with China.
Labor was willing to form coalitions to oppose the measure, but
ultimately their opposition was rooted in their special interests.
When later looking at labor’s campaign efforts in 2000, Masters
(2004) returned with the claim that the bottom line of union
effectiveness is in how its actions affect membership, as that is
its primary interest.
Critics of the pluralist school have claimed that its
constituent scholars have too quickly concluded that there is no
social orientation of unions from separate research where
comparativists discredit class orientation (Coleman, 1988;
Radcliff & Saiz, 1998). Their evidence of this rested in the
success of unions in achieving broader social aims, both in the
form of legislation and expenditures. Pluralists can reply with
the theory of interest group coalitions, but it remains difficult to
discredit findings of union influence on non-union interests.
Another criticism is based on whether or not unions are really
independent enough of the Democratic Party to act as a usual
social group. While scholars of the pluralist school have made
claims of independence, the overwhelming disparity in union
support for Democrats compared to Republicans even following
events like the passage of NAFTA has suggested that unions may
not have much of a choice of who to support (Masters &
Zardkoohi, 1986; Dark, 2003).
Democratic Coalition School
The body of scholarship following the Democratic coalition
school focuses on the relationship between the Democratic Party
and labor in order to explain what political influence unions may
have. These scholars vary in the degree to which they can
imagine unions affecting the policies of the Democratic Party
either as a matter of desire or ability, but almost unanimously
agree that if unions were to affect public expenditures, they
would need to do it exclusively through the mechanisms of the
party they have aligned with (Greenstone, 1969; Dark, 2001). As
such, unions may affect public expenditures, but it is through the
Democratic Party that they do so.
The origin of this perspective might be found in the
influential work of Greenstone (1969), who is often cited for his
contributions in understanding the relationship between the
Democratic Party and organized labor. He presented unions as
having assumed an integral part in the Democratic Party,
aggregating political demands of other groups rather than acting
primarily as an interest group seeking special advantages. The
result of this was a dependence on the Democrats that made labor
into a nationwide electoral organization for the Democratic
Party. Evidence of this dependence can be seen in research
showing that unions invariably prefer Democrats in their PAC
allocations despite claims of nonpartisanship (Masters &
Zardkoohi, 1986). Amenta and Poulsen (1996) explored statelevel outcomes for New Deal social spending programs, and
their findings were consistent with Greenstone’s assertions.
Labor was willing to help with New Deal programs, despite
worries that some programs would undercut union members’
wages, because of the strong Democrat-labor alliance.
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More recent investigations from this school have shown that
despite the challenges of general union decline and the Reagan
presidency, the labor-Democratic party alliance continues to
characterize the political influence of unions (Dark, 1996;
Francia, 2010). Using the close relationship between the AFLCIO and the Speaker Wright in the 1980s as an example, Dark
claimed that the Democratic Party relies on unions and, in return,
unions can only advance their own interests through the
Democratic Party. Dark (2000) presented further proof of this
reliance in the “energetic” efforts of unions to elect Democrats
in the 1998 elections. This perspective is expanded in his book
where Dark (2001) continued to engage with the seeming
paradox of declining labor membership and intensifying political
action. He resolved this paradox through examination of the
symbiotic relationship between labor lobbyists and
Congressional Democrats. Democrats, he explained, view
unions as the lynchpin of social reconstruction, but unions only
achieve success when it fits into wider political decision making.
Dark (2003) also contributed an understanding of the nature of
labor’s inclusion in the two-party system with an examination of
their bargaining strategies. While unions can technically break
party lines, and in about 4% of endorsements do so, actually
defecting is not a serious strategy that unions can employ. As
such, any influence that they have must be almost entirely
expressed through the Democratic Party. This tradition of
thinking is still strong, as can be seen in Francia’s (2010)
interpretation of labor as a campaign and electoral arm of the
Democratic Party when considering PAC contributions.
Critics of this school consider the labor-Democratic alliance
to be overstated, citing research showing that unions are attentive
almost exclusively to voting records rather than party affiliation
(Gopoian, Smith, & Smith, 1984). Democratic coalition scholars
can answer this by pointing out the disparity in endorsements,
but the fact remains that unions have been willing to endorse
Republicans when they can count on them to support union
legislation. Additionally, researchers who have included both
party and union strength into their models are quick to point out
that unions have an independent effect, which is hard for this
school to explain (Radcliff & Saiz, 1998). When unions affect
policy liberalism in the absence of Democratic Party control, it
is hard not to conclude that they must have some wider options
for influencing politics.

the arguments of Coleman (1988). Using ALF-CIO policies as
evidence, he made the case that unions have transitioned from
their formative interest group years into a social movement.
They have gained influence through cultivating an alliance with
all disenfranchised low-wage workers, including those who are
not unionized, and are now obligated to advocate for the broader
interests of that group. This is a conclusion commonly echoed by
scholars of this school, such as Radcliff and Saiz (1998), who
found that unions seem to have an interest in all areas where
lower-class citizens have a great public stake; furthermore, they
used pooled time series data from 1964 - 1982 to show that
unions had a systematic effect on policy liberalism divorced
from effects of the Democratic Party. Looking at “veto actor”
responses to globalization, Ha (2008) found a strong union effect
on welfare spending, which further argues for the concept of
unions as agents pushing for social interests. Another approach
within this school was to look union actions through the
perspective of public goods theory, suggesting that union
members are both providers and consumers of public goods,
which will result in unions positively affecting the provision of
public goods even in areas where there are no special benefits for
union members (Marlow & Orzechowski, 1996).
Scholars of this school have also contributed to the body of
literature on union revitalization – the catch-all term for the
efforts of unions to reverse the current trends of decline and
stagnation. It is argued that revitalized unions are more likely to
take part in broad social issues rather than pursuer narrow special
interests. An example of this argument is found in Albert’s
(2014) findings that revitalized unions actually take part in more
hearings on broad social issues than they do hearings on core
labor issues, in comparison to historic examples which showed
inverse results.
A major critique of this school, however, can be found in the
work of Burstein and Linton (2002), whose efforts in tabulating
research showed that scholars tend only to prove the direct
impact of organizations about 50% of the time. Some of their
suggestions for why this could be the case include the systematic
overestimation of organization effects and the use of
organization resources rather than actions to measure influence.
It is easy to see how these criticisms could be leveled at social
interest research such as that of Radcliff and Saiz, whose
measurements of union effects were focused on density.
Nevertheless, scholars of this school would point to the
consensus between qualitative analyses of political actions such
as Albert’s tallies of union participation in hearings and
quantitative analyses using union resources in defense of their
methodologies. An additional criticism of this school lies in the
contradiction between unions being a broad alliance of
disenfranchised workers alongside the clear decline of union
strength (Freeman & Murdoff, 1985). Scholars of the socialinterest school would respond to this argument by pointing to the
continued political influence of unions despite lower
membership, especially in light of the revitalization strategies.
Despite these criticisms, the social-interest school remains
the most promising current of thought for future research for a
number of reasons, not the least because of the limited amount

Social-Interest School
Those who support the social-interest school argue that
while unions undeniably are concerned with the interests of their
membership, unions have adopted broader social goals that now
characterize their political action (Coleman, 1988; Albert, 2014).
From this assumption, these scholars concluded that unions will
influence all areas of public expenditures, even those in which
union members have no direct stake. They will do so because
they are acting out of social-interests rather than the specialinterests suggested by earlier scholars.
An early example of this literature (which seems to have
evolved out of even earlier, now mostly abandoned, conceptions
of American unions as vehicles of class struggle) can be seen in
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of literature on it. Its ability to describe the recent revitalization
actions of unions as well as demonstrated union influences on
broad public policy matters are also strong points in its favor. In
contrast the pluralist school is limited as a result of its conception
of unions as serving the primary purpose of achieving special
benefits, especially when considered alongside literature that
suggests their inability to truly protect their monopoly powers.
The Democratic coalition school is similarly limited in that it
restricts the union world of political action within the party
system, causing it to have inadequate responses to findings of
independent union effects.
Theory
At its base, the social-interest school asserts that unions use
their political influence to attain broad social goals. Unions that
are acting in this way would therefore be expected to increase
public spending in a variety of areas, including those where
union members did not directly benefit. As actors pursuing these
social goals, they would also be expected to have an independent
effect when accounting for other institutions. Finally, unions
from this perspective would be expected to their influence evenly
to achieve desired amounts of public goods. These conclusions
lead to the following three hypotheses:
H1. If there is an increase in union strength in a state, then
there will be an increase in the amount of social wealth that goes
into various areas of public spending in that state.
The scholarship of the social-interest school places its
foundation upon the assumption that unions will influence public
policy towards the social interest. Previous researchers have
supported this assumption with a mix of quantitative and
qualitative findings which have tied union strength and
involvement with public spending and policy liberalism. This
hypothesis is meant to test this underlying assumption across a
broader number of expenditures. It is expected that the greater
strength that unions have in a state, the more that state will be
influenced to allocate wealth to social expenditures. This result
would be consistent with previous findings of the relationship
between unions and spending, including those of the pluralist
school, and would be the natural result of unions whose political
influence is directed towards social rather than exclusive ends.
While this model relies on the assumption that unions will use
additional resources if available, previous findings of
significance using similar conceptions of union strength suggest
that this assumption is not unfounded.
H2. If there is an increase in union strength in a state, then
there will be an independent marginal effect on the amount of
social wealth going into public spending even when accounting
for the influence of the Democratic Party.
This second hypothesis is in response to the Democratic
coalition school’s suggestions that if unions are to affect public
policy, they will have to do so through their symbiotic
relationship with the Democratic Party. While scholarship in the
social-interest school has yet to demonstrate a completely
independent union effect across several types of public
expenditures, there have been findings which distinguished
between the two. With these findings in mind, it is expected that
unions will have statistically significant effects even after the full

influence of the Democratic Party has been accounted for. This
marginal effect would be the clear result of unions exerting
independent political influence to expand public spending.
H3. If there is an increase in union strength, then there will
be a proportional increase in all areas of public expenditure.
Thus far scholars in the pluralist school have been able to
explain possible union effects as a natural result of unions
maintaining coalitions to secure their interests. Such a
conclusion is in direct contention with the social-interest
argument that unions have instead act on a broader social stance.
The function of this hypothesis is to resolve this disagreement.
The thought is that if unions are merely contributing to other
social causes in return for future support, any influence that they
have over less beneficial expenditures would be smaller than
over areas from which unions directly benefit. Why, after all,
would unions (when conceived of as special interest groups)
bother expending their influence if they did not receive more in
return than they could accomplish on their own? It is instead
expected unions will have a relatively uniform effect on social
expenditures; if unions are acting primarily on behalf of broad
social objectives instead of narrow special interests, they have
little reason to prioritize one area over another.
Method
The data in this study pertained to all fifty states and
Washington D.C. and was taken from a variety of primary
sources. Regarding the dependent variables, the US Census
Bureau was used exclusively with the Public Education Finances
Report being used to find per-pupil education expenditures and
the State & Local Finances Report being used to extract spending
on the following areas: public welfare, hospitals, highways,
housing and community development, and unemployment
compensation. These areas were selected to provide types of
expenditures where union members could conceivably receive a
direct and exclusive benefit in the form of wages or jobs
(education, hospitals, health), a strategic benefit when
bargaining with employers (unemployment compensation), or a
social, non-exclusive benefit in the form of public goods (public
welfare, highways, and housing and community development).
Analyzing the effects of union strength across these different
areas would provide a clear picture of what, if anything, unions
prioritized when influencing social spending. Furthermore, it
was decided to analyze the combination of state and local
expenditures rather than just one or the other to capture the total
possible influence of unions within a state.
After being collected, the different areas were then
converted to 2009 dollars in order to match the gross state
product (GSP) data taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). The areas of expenditure were then divided by the GSP
of each state and multiplied by one-hundred, yielding a
percentage which is hereafter referred to as the “amount of social
wealth” allocated in a state. This transformation was necessary
to present expenditures in terms of relative social spending.
Previously chosen methods that examine proportions of public
spending such as that used by Marlow and Orzechowski (1996)
treat public spending as if 10% of the budget of a rich, fiscally
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conservative state is equivalent to 10% of the budget of a poor
state with expansive social programs. What is instructive when
looking at relative social expenditures is therefore less the
proportion of a state budget and more the average wealth per
person which is going towards social expenditures.
In terms of the explanatory variables, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics was used to derive data on union density (DENSITY)
and unemployment (UNEM); furthermore, an indicator variable
for the presence of right to work laws (RTW with 1 coded as the
presence of such a law) was derived from the National
Conference of State Legislatures website. Together union
density and unemployment were conceived of as union strength.
As discussed earlier, there has been some criticism of looking at
the effects of social groups using only their available resources
(Paul & Linton, 2002); however, union density remains a
descriptive proxy variable for union strength in a given state as
membership inevitably provides a limiting factor on the ability
of unions to influence politics either through mobilization or
spending. Similarly, right to work laws capture unions’ ability to
draw strength from non-members and as such provides a picture
of the rest of unions’ available resources in a state.2
Unemployment was included to control for the impact of outside
economic effects on expenditures.
As mentioned, GSP per capita data (GSP) was taken from
the BEA. Its inclusion controlled for a natural increase or decline
in proportional social spending as relative wealth increased.
Control of state legislatures was derived from the Nation
Conference of State Legislatures, which detailed which party
controlled the upper house, lower house, and governorship of
each state in each year. This data has been coded into an indicator
variable (DEM) where 1 shows that the Democratic Party had
control over both houses and the governorship and 0 shows that
they had lost control of at least one house or the governorship.
This method was decided upon from a small pool of alternatives 3
through a series of preliminary regressions which showed the
chosen coding to have the greatest explanatory power; it was
selected in this way as its main purpose was to isolate the
independent influence of unions, and the measurement with the
highest explanatory power would do the best job of doing so.
Additionally, an interaction between union density and this
indicator variable was included in order to see whether union
strength and Democratic control had complementary effects; it
was necessary for the analysis of the second hypothesis that such
codependent effects be separated from independent influence.
In order to avoid potential autocorrelation problems with the
use of panel data, a time variable was also included. Finally, an
indicator variable was included for before and after the 2008

recession (REC). It was included after some early graphical
analyses showed that the influence of union strength may have
changed whenever expenditures started to fall in real terms rather
than increase as they had in the preceding period. An interaction
effect between this variable and union density was also included
in the event that the recession changed the slope as well as the
intercept of the relationship.
To test for a relationship between unions and public
expenditures, a series of OLS regressions were run on the
mentioned areas of public spending. The explanatory variables
of union density, right to work laws, the interaction between the
two, unemployment, Democratic control, the time variable, the
recession indicator, the two interaction terms, and GSP were
used to explain the variability of state public expenditures. The
estimated coefficients for the marginal effects of union strength
and their significance were intended to make it clear how unions
are using their influence and whether this influence is
independent of the Democratic Party.
The final hypothesis was tested using a number of pairwise
comparisons; these analyses were intended to compare the
relative effect of unions across different types of expenditures. It
was decided to use pairwise comparisons rather than a single
group comparison in order to see where union influence was
different if it existed. To accomplish this, the social wealth
percentages created earlier were standardized in order to
represent proportional effects of union strength. The data for one
type of expenditure was then appended to the end of the data for
spending of another type. Following this, the independent
variables that were used in the main regressions were copied for
both data series. An indicator variable was subsequently created,
which served the purpose of denoting which data represented
which expenditures. Finally, an interaction term between union
density and this indicator was included. The significance and
sign of this interaction would show whether there was a
significant difference in the affect that unions had on each area.

2

their presence was not driving the relationships found. As such,
they have remained in the model so that results apply to all
states plus Washington D.C. Graphical examinations of
assumed normality and equal variance otherwise showed no
signs of major concern for most models. White’s general test
confirmed some heteroskedasticity in areas of expenditure such
as highways. No transformation was undertaken so that
coefficients could still be easily compared.

Results
The results of the regressions on the seven different areas of
public expenditures are shown in Table 1.4 All of the regressions
themselves were statistically significant, although the model
underperformed when explaining health expenditures. For every
regression at least one and often two of the components of union
strength were significant, and in all cases unions displayed a
positive influence on public expenditures, confirming the
predictions of the first hypothesis. Furthermore, they do so in the
presence of Democratic control variables affirming the basic
precept of the second hypothesis that union strength has an

While these two variables add some collinearity to the model
(VIF = 1.9) and their interaction term even more so, they are
descriptive enough that the inclusion of both is warranted.
3
These include coding 1 as the Democrats either holding both
houses or holding the governorship, adding split legislatures to
the coding of 1, and lagged values of each measurement.
4
There were a few states that exhibited consistently high
studentized residuals, but auxiliary regressions showed that
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independent influence. In the instances that the interaction
between union density and right to works laws was significant,
it can be seen that the presence of a right to work law at the very
least nullifies union influence (as in the case of education) and
in most cases reverses the influence of union density. One
possible reason for this is that the multicollinearity between the
RTW variable and its interaction variable resulted in the latter
subsuming all of the influence of such a law beyond its direct
impact on union strength. Another possible explanation is that in
states without right to work laws unions have had a cumulative
effect on public expenditures that dissipates in states that have
such legislation.
Also, interesting are the cases in which the RTW variable
displays an explanatory power either equally strong or stronger
than union density. In the instance of unemployment, the
variable has the predicted effect of reducing public spending as
a result of decreasing union strength (that unions only appear to
influence unemployment spending in interaction with

Table 1. OLS estimations of state and local public expenditures.
Per Pupil
Spending

Constant
DENSITY
RTW
DENSITY*
RTW
GSP
DEM
UNEM
REC

DENSITY*
DEM
DENSITY*
REC
TIME

Education
24.3505*
24.36
0.2438*
4.28
-0.7722
-0.89
-0.2423*
-2.71
-0.00013*
-15.79
3.1602*
3.98
0.0637
0.83
-1.447***
-1.69
-0.2185*
-3.64
0.0732
1.33
0.2827*
3.05

Public Welfare
3.0992*
14.51
0.0435*
3.58
0.06
0.32
-0.0775*
-4.06
-0.000017*
-10.07
1.2953*
7.64
0.0381**
2.31
0.1561
0.85
-0.0979*
-7.65
-0.0058
-0.49
0.0465**
2.35

2

Hospital
0.1236
0.76
0.0198**
2.14
0.8668*
6.16
-0.0251***
-1.73
-0.000006*
-4.40
0.3230**
2.50
0.0747*
5.94
0.0015
0.01
-0.0239**
-2.44
-0.0122
-1.36
0.0213
1.41

R
0.403
0.308
0.31
SE
3.4567
0.7384
0.5632
F
38.82*
25.89*
26.15*
n
561
561
561
t-statistics below estimated coefficients
*, **, and *** show significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels or greater.

Democratic control here can be explained as there being a
relatively inflexible floor on unemployment spending that only
Democratic legislatures are willing to raise, and only when under
pressure from unions to do so). The sign of the effects on housing
and hospitals seems peculiar. However, why would union
density and the presence of a right to work law increase public
spending, but the interaction between the two result in union
density having a net contractionary effect on public spending? A
possible explanation that remediates this anomaly with the rest
of the results is that in the absence of union effects there is a
disproportionate amount of spending on hospital construction
and development. As union density increases in a right to work
state, public expenditures are spread more evenly resulting in a
negative coefficient on the interaction variable. Such an
explanation would be in line with the first hypothesis, with union
strength having a positive although more even influence on
expenditures.

Public Spending as a Percentage of GSP
Health
0.4699*
8.47
0.0073**
2.30
0.0168
0.35
-0.0101**
-2.04
-0.000001*
-3.01
-0.0035
-0.08
0.01101**
2.57
-0.0182
-0.38
-0.0031
-0.92
-0.0025
-0.81
0.0055
1.08

Highways
1.5446*
11.74
0.0278*
3.71
0.0453
0.40
0.0026
0.22
-0.000006*
-5.52
0.3692*
3.53
-0.0556
-5.48
0.0173
0.15
-0.0494*
-6.25
0.0048
0.67
0.0125
1.02

Housing and
Community
0.0220
0.48
0.0128*
4.94
0.1575*
4.01
-0.0217*
-5.34
0.000002*
4.11
0.1978*
5.48
0.0059***
1.70
-0.0128
-0.33
-0.0129*
-4.76
0.0020
0.80
0.0016
0.38

Unemployment
0.1394*
3.34
0.0019
0.81
-0.1106*
-3.07
0.0045
1.20
-0.000003*
-7.67
-0.0389
-1.17
0.0800*
24.84
0.3192*
8.92
0.0047*
1.88
0.0094*
4.08
-0.0493*
-12.75

0.064
0.1918
4.84*
561

0.196
0.4551
14.64*
561

0.182
0.1573
13.42*
561

0.751
0.1443
169.83*
561

42
https://encompass.eku.edu/kjus/vol5/iss1/7

Kentucky Journal of Undergraduate Scholarship

Issue 5 (2021)

Table 2. OLS estimations of differences between standardized union effects.

Public Welfare

Hospital

0.1811*
13.3

0.1765*
12.95

N/A

Health

0.0307**
2.15

0.0261***
1.778

-0.1503*
-10.27

N/A

Highways

0.1071*
7.69

0.1025*
7.19

-0.0739*
-5.08

0.0764*
5.03

N/A

Housing and
Community

0.0051
0.36

0.0005
0.04

-0.1759*
-12.2

-0.0256***
-1.68

-0.102
0.02

N/A

Unemployment

0.0299**
0.0252**
-0.1512*
2.43
2.02
-11.9
Columns coded as 0, rows as 1.
t statistics below estimated coefficents
*, **, and *** show significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels or greater.

-0.0009
-0.07

-0.0773*
-5.42

0.0247**
1.84

A final interesting finding to note in Table 1 is that the
interaction between Democratic control and union density
(except in the area of unemployment) has a negative sign when
it is significant. This provides a nuanced view of the second
hypothesis, as it suggests that unions only have a separate, net
additive effect on three areas. In the presence of a Democratic
legislature the previous independent effects of unions become
mired with the effects of the Democratic Party, in a way similar
to that predicted by the Democratic Coalition school of thought.
The results of comparing different union effects can be seen
in Table 2. That multiple differences between proportional union
effects are statistically significant provides evidence against the
final hypothesis that unions would spread their influence evenly
across areas of expenditure. What is interesting is that the
analyses show that unions are more efficient at affecting some
areas conceived of as providing non-exclusive benefits such as
highway construction than they are at influencing areas
providing exclusive benefits like education or health. This result
seems to rebuke both the social-interest view of broadly
interested unions as well as the pluralist view of narrowly selfinterested unions. A possible explanation for this is that the
amount of influence necessary to change different areas of public
spending varies, making the standardized effect of general union
strength a poor measure of how much union influence is being
applied. Future research along these lines will be needed to come
to a conclusive answer.

Conclusions
Historic trends in union decline only seem to be continuing,
making an understanding of what their absence will entail even
more important. Thus, this paper asked the question of how
union strength affected state and local public expenditures. A
series of regressions were run to test whether unions had a
positive impact, whether this impact was independent of
Democratic Party control, and whether union influence was even
across areas. The data lends nuanced support to the first two
hypotheses. In general union strength increased public
expenditures as social-interest scholars predicted, but in doing
so evenly it results in situations such as that of hospital spending
in a right to work state; in such a situation increased union
density causes disproportionate hospital spending to fall to the
level of other areas of spending rather than simply increasing it.
Similarly, union strength demonstrated an expected independent
effect on public spending in the absence of a fully Democratic
state government, but in almost all cases the independent
influence of unions gets mired into Democratic influence when
that party controls state government. The third hypothesis lead
to a peculiar conclusion when union effects were not equal across
areas, but the hierarchy of efficacy in influencing expenditures
placed non-exclusive areas as the most prioritized. The likely
explanation for this result is that general union effects were a
poor model for how unions were using their influence
proportionately.
Future research on this subject may wish to take the analysis
a step further and investigate where this spending was focused
on in the studied areas. For example, goals of future analyses

Public Welfare

Hospital

Health

N/A

43
Published by Encompass, 2021

Highways

Housing and
Community

Education
0.0047
0.36
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Dark, T. (2001). The Unions and the Democrats: An Enduring Alliance. Cornell
University Press.
Dark, T. (2003). To reward and punish: A classification of union political
strategies. Journal of Labor Research, 24(3), 457–472.
Delaney, J. T. (1991). The future of unions as political organizations. Journal of
Labor Research, 12(4), 373–387.
Department of Commerce. US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
https://www.bea.gov/.
Department
of
Commerce.
United
States
Census
Bureau.
https://www.bls.gov/home.htm.
Department of Labor. US Bureau of Labor Statistics. https://www.bls.gov/cps/.
Francia, P. L. (2010). Assessing the labor-democratic party alliance: A one-sided
relationship? Polity, 3, 293.
Freeman, R.B. & Medoff, J.L. (1984). What Do Unions Do? Basic Books.
Gopoian, J. D., Smith, H., & Smith, W. (1984). What makes PACs tick? An
analysis of the allocation patterns of economic interest groups. American
Journal of Political Science, 28(2), 259–281.
Greenstone, J. D. (1969). Labor in American Politics. Knopf.
Ha, E. (2008). Globalization, veto players, and welfare spending. Comparative
Political Studies, 41(6), 783–813.
Katz, H. C., Batt, R., & Keefe, J. (2003). “The revitalization of the CWA:
Integrating collective bargaining, political action, and organizing. ILR Review,
56(4): 573–589.
Marlow, M. L. & Orzechowski, W. (1996). Public sector unions and public
spending. Public Choice, 89(2), 1–16.
Masters, M. F. & Zardkoohi A. (1986). The determinants of labor PAC
allocations to legislators. Industrial Relations, 25(3), 328–38.
Masters, M. F., Zardkoohi A. & Atkin R. S. (1996). Financial and political
resources of nine major public sector unions in the 1980s. Journal of Labor
Research, 17(1), 183–198.
Masters, M. F. & Zardkoohi A. (1998). AFSCME as a political union. Journal of
Labor Research, 19(2), 313–349.
Masters, M. F. & Zardkoohi A. (2004). Unions in the 2000 election: A strategicchoice perspective. Journal of Labor Research, 25(1), 139–182.
Masters, M. F., Zardkoohi A., & Delaney, J.T. (2005). Organized labor’s political
scorecard. Journal of Labor Research, 3, 365–392.
National Conference of State Legislatures. http://www.ncsl.org/.
Radcliff, B. & Saiz M. (1998). Labor organization and public policy in the
American states. Journal of Politics, 60(1), 113.
Raymond, H., Shulman, S., & Weiler, S. (2004). Right-to-work legislation, social
capital, and variations in state union density. The Review of Regional Studies;
New Brunswick, 34(1): 95–111.

should explore questions such as does increased expenditure on
highways result in better wages and safety precautions, more and
better maintained highways, or both, for example. It might also
be helpful to take the advice of Burstein and Linton and more
explicitly attempt to look at union actions and motivations to
better understand their influence as well as how much is being
placed towards certain ends.
In conclusion, it can be seen that union strength has a
generally positive effect on public expenditures, this effect exists
both independently of Democratic control and alongside it, and
that unions do not seem to have a proportionate influence on all
areas of expenditure. Thus, the historic trend of union decline
that this paper opened with is likely to result in a lesser amount
of the social wealth of states going into public expenditures. This
effect is open to be valued subjectively, but it is an important
factor to keep in mind when deciding the fate of unions.
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